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INTRODUCTION
Are you twenty-eight years old, feel encumbered by the
past, and find yourself unable to achieve your initial promise?
Do you think it’s about time to get your head in the cloud?
“Yes,” replied the Stored Communications Act.1 Four years
before the introduction of the World Wide Web, Congress
passed the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) as part of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) in 1986 to
govern access to electronically stored communications.2
Premised on the 1980’s computer technology, the SCA
represented a remarkably progressive statutory framework
that established privacy safeguards for emerging
technologies.3
Outdated and disjointed nearly three decades later, the
SCA finds itself struggling to maintain applicability and
legitimacy amidst the recent thunderstorm of technological
innovation. Today, the SCA provides a tangled web of
“Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections, regulating the
relationship between government investigators and [Internet]
service providers in possession of users’ private information.”4
Today’s Americans, more forward thinking than ever
before, have their heads in the cloud. The cloud represents a

1. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
2. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
3. See Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Electronic Communications: The
Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
349, 351 (2009).
4. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004)
[hereinafter Kerr, SCA User’s Guide].
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transformative computing model where users share or store
their information on remote servers owned or operated by
third parties.5 Files once confined to one’s home are now
readily accessible in his or her respective virtual home with
the simple tap of a finger on any Internet-connected device.6
As society increasingly turns away from the personal
computing model, the recent proliferation of cloud computing
engenders considerable uncertainty as to the SCA’s scope of
privacy protections to communications stored in the cloud.7
The SCA’s inability to guarantee constitutional privacy
protections in the current technological landscape—
unanticipated by Congress in 1986—will undermine
consumer and corporate trust, and consequently, stifle
technological innovation.
It is crucial for Congress to look at clouds from both sides
now, because the SCA really doesn’t consider clouds at all.8
This Comment argues that the existing statutory framework
inadequately protects cloud users and propositions Congress
to amend the SCA so as to not marginalize individuals who
migrate their data from their in-home filing cabinets to their
digital lockers in the cloud. The SCA should ensure parity
between content stored physically and electronically.
Parts I through V provide the foundation for this
discussion by exploring the cloud and the applicable
constitutional and statutory doctrines. Together, Parts VI
and VII demonstrate that the SCA’s archaic framework has
created a fragmented set of privacy protections that leave
cloud-computing platforms outside the statute’s protection.
Finally, Part VIII proposes statutory amendments that
adequately reflect the existing technological landscape while
providing flexibility for emerging technologies as they become
relevant. Having argued that data in the cloud should receive

5. Robert Gellman, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and
Confidentiality From Cloud Computing (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.world
privacyforum.org/pdflWPFCloud PrivacyReport.pdf.
6. How Cloud Computing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM http://computer.
howstuffworks. com/cloud-computing/cloud-computing.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2013).
7. See e.g., Ilana R. Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored
Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in
the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 619 (2011) (explaining that the
personal computing model is a model “in which users access, store, and manage
their data and processing locally on their own PCs.”).
8. JONI MITCHELL, BOTH SIDES NOW (Reprise 1969).
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protection comparable to their tangible equivalents, Part VIII
advocates for “tech neutrality,” where, regardless of future
developments in communication technology, the presence and
application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
remain constant.9
I. CLOUD COMPUTING PLATFORMS
Cloud computing represents a dynamic technological and
computational advance. With about 69% of United States
Internet users currently utilizing cloud-based platforms and
with $241 billon industry forecasts by 2020, experts project
cloud computing to revolutionize “how businesses function,
how cities are planned, and how people carry out their
work.”10 This section will detail the technological landscape
that facilitated the cloud’s evolution, define cloud computing
and its variations, and explain how individuals utilize the
cloud.
A. Technological Landscape & Evolution
While the cloud computing paradigm recently gained
traction as a trendy and widespread infrastructure, its
underlying concepts are derivative of 1960s technologies:
mainframe
and
personal
computing
models.11
Firmsrecognizing the then-inordinate costs to acquire,
maintain, and operate mainframe computersessentially
acted as landlords and allowed users to “operate on slices of a
central server’s time and resources.”12 This technological real
estate market quickly dissipated during the following two
decades with the advent of the fairly inexpensive
minicomputer.13 In the 1990s, Application Service Providers
(“ASPs”) quickly emerged as industry leaders, providing
standardized, fully provisioned, and fully maintained
9. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A
General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Fourth
Amendment to the Internet].
10. Jay P. Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud
Computing: Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 341, 356 (2013).
11. See John Soma et al., Chasing the Clouds Without Getting Drenched: A
Call for Fair Practices in Cloud Computing Services, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 193,
196 (2011).
12. Id.
13. ANDY MULHOLLAND ET AL., ENTERPRISE CLOUD COMPUTING: A
STRATEGY GUIDE FOR BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY LEADERS 15 (2010).
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applications accessible over Internet-connected personal
computers.14
Just as quickly as the ASPs dissipated
alongside the rubble of the dot-com bust, the arrival of
virtualization technologies, ubiquitous Internet deployment,
commoditizing of hardware, and software standardization set
the stage for shared-services computing’s comeback
performance.15
B. Defining the Cloud
In the midst of an August 2006 address at the Search
Engine Strategies Conference, Google, Inc. CEO Eric Schmidt
gave wind to the term, “cloud computing,” by referring to
software applications hosted on remote servers.16 The cloud
is a collection of interconnected computers and servers
In network
publically accessible via the Internet.17
diagrams—comprised of servers, client PCs, switches,
routers, and the Internet—the cloud icon represents the
overarching element that allows the network to function.18
Consisting of networks, remote web-based applications, and
remote data storage, cloud computing essentially represents a
metaphor for the Internet.19
Despite significant efforts to define cloud computing, its
existing definitions vary and will likely be refined when the
The National
paradigm becomes better understood.20
Institute of Standards & Technology (“NIST”) defines cloud
computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient,
on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable

14. Id.
15. See Soma et al., supra note 11, at 196–97; see also, Soma et al., supra
note 11, at n.11 (“‘ Virtualization’ is a method of running multiple independent
virtual operating systems on a single physical computer.”); see generally Soma
et al., supra note 11 (explaining that “Commoditizing of hardware” is the mass
production and ease of access as well as the identical nature of hardware).
16. See Jacob M. Small, Storing Documents in the Cloud: Toward an
Evidentiary Privilege Protecting Papers and Effects Stored on the Internet, 23
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 255, 258 (2013).
17. See id. at 258–59.
18. See Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1623, 1626 (2013).
19. See ANTHONY T. VELTE ET AL., CLOUD COMPUTING: A PRACTICAL
APPROACH 3–4 (2010); see also Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud:
Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 360–61 (2010).
20. William R. Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Law of Cloud
Computing and Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 237 (2010).
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computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service
provider interaction.”21 To simplify NIST’s definition, cloud
computing is “a different way for people to use their
computers.”22
C. Using the Cloud
While computer users of earlier decades needed to
maintain specialized software on their hard drives to
accomplish various tasks, the cloud securely delivers that
sophisticated technology as a virtual platform on the Internet
at the physical access-point on an as-needed basis.23 Located
in data centers around the world, thousands of computers
handle data processing and storage for millions of users.24
Users enjoy anywhere access to their files and applications
once they move their content to the cloud.25
Clouds take on several different structures and functions
depending on the varying needs of the end-users, provider’s
framework, and service exchange.26 Organizations deploy
clouds in two predominant ways: (1) privately on the
organization’s infrastructure, or (2) publically over the
Internet as a fee-based, advertiser-supported service.27 While
private cloud users encounter similar risks as public cloud
users, the public cloud is the foremost concern for policy
makers and industry leaders.28
The industry generally partitions public clouds into three
21. PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L. INST. OF STANDARDS AND
TECH., THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (Sept. 2011), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf.
22. Small, supra note 16, at 259.
23. See Kesan et al., supra note 10, at 355.
24. See Soghoian, supra note 19, at 364.
25. See Darlene Bedley, A Look at the Proposed Electronic Communications
Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011: Where Is Smart Grid Technology, and
How Does Inevitable Discovery Apply?, 36 NOVA L. REV. 521, 524 (2012).
26. See Jenna Gerber, Head Out of the Clouds: What the United States May
Learn from the European Union’s Treatment of Data in the Cloud, 23 IND. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 245, 247 (2013).
27. See Timothy D. Martin, Hey! You! Get Off of My Cloud: Defining and
Protecting the Metes and Bounds of Privacy, Security, and Property in Cloud
Computing, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 283, 287 (2010).
28. See Brad Smith, Microsoft Urges Government and Industry to Work
Together to Build Confidence in the Cloud, MICROSOFT (Oct. 20, 2013, 8:45 PM),
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2010/jan10/1-20brookingspr.aspx
(Senior Vice President and General Counsel).
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service models based on the distinct capabilities offered to the
consumer: (1) Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”), (2) Platform-asa-Service (“PaaS”), and (3) Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(“IaaS”).29 SaaS involves the “capability provided to the
consumer . . . to use the provider’s applications running on a
PaaS involves the “capability
cloud infrastructure.”30
provided to the consumer . . . to deploy onto the cloud
infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications
created using programming languages and tools supported by
the provider.”31 IaaS involves the “capability provided to the
consumer . . . to provision processing, storage, networks, and
other fundamental computing resources . . . IaaS providers
supply only the necessary resources that organizations
require.”32
Businesses and users migrate their content to the cloud,
as its delivery model provides alluring advantages to both
service providers and end-users alike.33 Service providers
benefit from their enhanced ability to readily deny or
terminate access to troublesome users, heighten security, and
guard sensitive intellectual property and technology.34 When
software is delivered via the Internet, unauthorized copying
is virtually nonexistent.35 Where users are unable to host the
tools on their own servers, and where cloud products’
computation and coding remain tightly held on the given
provider’s servers, cloud providers do not encounter the
infamous and illegal network-sharing of expensive and
essential technology such as Microsoft Office, Adobe
29. See Gerber, supra note 26, at 247.
30. Hien Timothy M. Nguyen, Cloud Cover: Privacy Protections and the
Stored Communications Act in the Age of Cloud Computing, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2189, 2201 (2011) (ranging from productivity applications such as word
processing to entertainment hubs providing video and music).
31. See, e.g., id. (discussing how Microsoft’s Windows Azure provides the
function to build applications spanning from consumer Web to enterprise
scenarios).
32. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 113 (2010) (statement of The Computer &
Communications Industry Association) (“IaaS offers full-service virtual
information stacks designed to replace a company’s entire server room and
network through virtualization technology.”); see also, Ngyuen, supra note 30,
at 2201 (discussing how Netflix is moving its existing Internet technology to the
cloud via Amazon Web Services).
33. See Soma et al., supra note 11, at 201.
34. Soghoian, supra note 19, at 364.
35. Id.
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Photoshop, and the like.36 Similarly, trade secrets, such as
algorithms, that exist for such programs and applications are
considerably less accessible by competitors, as reverse
engineering is exceptionally difficult.37
Many cloud computing applications and services are
End-users enjoy either free or
consumer-oriented.38
inexpensive technologies, offering many of the same, basic
features found on their desktop counterparts, and more.39 By
sharing resources across numerous users, cloud platforms
significantly enhance users’ abilities to work collaboratively.40
End-users benefit from the cloud’s data preservation and
overwhelming accessibility: users may access applications
and data from any device, anywhere in the world, provided
they have some sort of Internet connection.41 As applications
run directly from the cloud, cloud computing provides a
simple solution to computer memory and storage capacity
issues.42 Alongside eliminating hard drive capacity issues,
cloud computing similarly eliminates hard drive failure
concerns.43 Cloud services regularly back up files on multiple
servers, giving users solace in that their files will never be
lost.44
The cloud’s abundant benefits are not without risk.
Migrating data to the cloud necessarily suggests that users
relinquish some dominion over that data.45 The ominous rain
cloud that looms over this innovative paradigm is privacy, or
the lack thereof. While the right to privacy represents “the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men,”46 conceptualizing this right in the cloud is a
perplexing endeavor.
Uncertainty as to privacy in the cloud should give pause
to users, providers, legislators, and judges alike. While no
36. Id.
37. Id. at 365.
38. See id. at 356–66.
39. See Tina Cheng, A Cloudy Forecast: Divergence in the Cloud Computing
Laws of the United States, European Union, and China, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 481, 484–85 (2013).
40. See Martin, supra note 27, at 297.
41. See Kesan et al., supra note 10, at 362.
42. Cheng, supra note 39, at 484.
43. See Paul Lanois, Caught in the Clouds: The Web 2.0, Cloud Computing,
and Privacy?, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 29, 29–30 (2010).
44. Cheng, supra note 39, at 484.
45. See Martin, supra note 27, at 300.
46. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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law expressly addresses privacy in the cloud, a cursory glance
at United States privacy law—both constitutional and
statutory—lends credence to the principle of safeguarding
user-privacy in the cloud.47
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment, applicable to federal, state, and
local investigators,48 serves as the primary regulator of law
enforcement conduct in the course of physical-world criminal
investigations.49 It provides, “the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”50
The Fourth Amendment requires that the government submit
a particular description of the places to be searched and the
While an all-encompassing
things to be seized.51
reasonableness standard provides the Fourth Amendment
with procedural legitimacy,52 the Supreme Court administers
the amendment’s goal by creating exacting standards that
proscribe what law enforcement can do, when, and under
what circumstances.53
The Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he overriding
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
state.”54 “It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
47. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848,
1860–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10 (2006)).
48. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961) (holding that the
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
49. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How A
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
805, 810 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Lifting the Fog].
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84
(1987) (describing the particularity required in a warrant for the places to be
searched); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 474 (1976) (describing
the permissible breadth of warranted seizures).
52. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (noting that the
Fourth Amendment’s “central requirement is one of reasonableness.”).
53. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and
the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1164 (1998).
54. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (finding no Fourth
Amendment violation where a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood
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rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the
offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”55
A. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Notwithstanding the apparently extensive protection
offered by the Fourth Amendment, not all government action
that uncovers probative evidence constitutes a “search”
within the Fourth Amendment context.56 Accordingly, the
Fourth Amendment does not guard against all searches in all
areas.57
Katz v. United States58 denotes the Court’s modern era
privacy doctrine.59 Katz arose when government agents,
without a search warrant, attached a listening device to the
exterior of a public phone booth—from which Katz made a
call—in order to eavesdrop on the defendant’s telephone
In finding the contents of the phone
conversation.60
conversation protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Court
emphasized that what a person seeks to maintain as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, is sacrosanct under
the Fourth Amendment.61
Justice Harlan, concurring in judgment, canonized the
penumbral privacy doctrine: the reasonable expectation of
privacy.62 Under his twofold adage, an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy where: (1) the individual
demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2)
where the expectation is objectively reasonable, i.e. “one that
society is prepared to recognize” as such.63 The courts have
since embraced Justice Harlan’s two-fold approach to assess

sample from a drunk driving suspect).
55. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (holding that compelling
a criminal defendant to produce incriminating documents constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search).
56. See Scolnik, supra note 3, at 353 (citing an example from Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) where a drug-detecting dog’s sniff did not
constitute a search).
57. See id.
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
59. See Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection
Erodes As E-Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U.L. REV. 1043, 1047 (2008).
60. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 349.
61. See id. at 353.
62. See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 361.
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the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.64
B. The Third Party Doctrine
While the Fourth Amendment may protect individuals
from unreasonable searches of items he or she maintains as
private, the Court somewhat undermined the initial promise
of Katz when propounding subsequent doctrines.65 The Court
developed the third party doctrine, which functions as a
coherent guideline in defining the reasonableness of an
individual’s expectation of privacy.66
Under the third party doctrine, an individual
relinquishes his or her reasonable expectation of privacy
when he or she knowingly reveals private information to
another person, effectively assuming the risk that the other
person will reveal the once-private information to the
government.67 If the third party willingly conveys that
information to such authorities, the government may then
use the once private material against the individual.68
Couch v. United States69 demarcates the Court’s first
encounter with the third party doctrine jurisprudence. Couch
argued that the Fourth Amendment protected documents
that the IRS subpoenaed from her accountant.70 The Court
held that an individual could not assert a Fourth Amendment
challenge to preclude the government from subpoenaing tax
records in her accountant’s possession.71 Since an accountant
necessarily reviews and hands over a client’s documents when
filing a tax return, Couch—by divesting such records to her
accountant—relinquished her reasonable expectation of
privacy in those documents.72
Expanding Couch, the Court in United States v. Miller73
found that a bank customer retained no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the financial documents he
64. See Scolnik, supra note 3, at 353.
65. See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic
Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1577 (2004).
66. See Small, supra note 16, at 262.
67. See Oza, supra note 59, at 1047.
68. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
69. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
70. See Small, supra note 16, at 264.
71. See Couch, 409 U.S. at 336.
72. See Small, supra note 16, at 264.
73. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

478

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

“voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business.”74 Despite
Miller’s subjective expectation of privacy, an objective
expectation could not exist with regard to the checks, deposit
slips, and financial statements freely disclosed to the bank
and its employees, as “the depositor takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to the government.”75
The Court then applied the third party doctrine to
electronic communications in Smith v. Maryland.76 Without a
search warrant, the police installed a pen register at the
company’s central office as a surveillance technique to record
numbers dialed from defendant Smith’s line.77 While Smith
asserted a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search and
seizure of the telephone number he dialed, the Court inferred
that, because customers received itemized bills listing the
long-distance calls they made, “telephone users, in sum,
typically know that they must convey numerical information
to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities
for recording this information; and that the phone company
does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate
business purposes.”78
Absent statutory guidance, the courts would be left to
determine the breadth of the third party doctrine with respect
to electronic communications through case law, which would
invariably lead to inconsistencies.79 The case law regarding
the
Fourth
Amendment’s
application
to
Internet
communications
remains
remarkably
sparse
and,
unfortunately for users, the existing case law does little to
safeguard their digital documents that are increasingly being
stored on remote third-party servers.80 As such, Congress, as
opposed to the courts, has the appropriate faculties and
institutional advantage to forage the complex technological
landscape and accordingly develop a statutory scheme to
which the courts will defer.81

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 443.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
See id. at 742–43.
Id.
See Small, supra note 16, at 262.
See Soghoian, supra note 19, at 390.
See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
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III. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF
1986
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(“ECPA”) represents a Congressional endeavor to prevent the
Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine from compromising
the privacy interests of electronic communications stored by
third parties.82 The ECPA is one of the nation’s premier
digital privacy laws.83 While the Fourth Amendment applies
exclusively to government intrusions, Congress, recognizing
that private parties pose a serious threat to Internet privacy,
defined the scenarios in which an individual may reasonably
maintain an expectation of privacy with regard to his or her
electronic communications.84
In the mid-1980s, consensus was reached among
members of Congress, the telecommunications industry, and
the computing industry that the nation’s developing
technologies were significantly out of tune with their
respective federal surveillance law and privacy safeguards.85
The House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs ascertained the urgency
for updating legal protections for electronic communications.86
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Patrick Leahy,
stated that the “ [then-] existing law [was] ‘hopelessly out of
date.’ ”87 An expert testifying at the House Committee
hearing said it was “reasonable to assume that during the
1990’s[,] electronic mail will become a regular and important
part of the communications mix that a substantial number of
Americans use.”88
Reservations as to the ambiguity between privacy
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 838
(2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Constitutional Myths].
82. See Oza, supra note 59, at 1054.
83. See Gerber, supra note 26, at 257.
84. See Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 81, at 872.
85. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks, Electronic Communication Privacy of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 130–31 (1985) (prepared statement of Jerry J. Berman,
on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)).
86. S. REP. 99-541, 2 (1986).
87. Id.
88. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, 99th Cong. 20 (1985) (testimony of Philip M. Walker,
General Regulatory Counsel, GTE Telenet Inc., and Vice Chairman, Electronic
Mail Association, accompanied by Michael F. Cavanagh, Executive Director,
Electronic Mail Association).
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protections and law enforcement access standards with
respect to electronic communications prompted the
committees to ask the Office of Technology Assessment to
evaluate threats posed by unregulated intrusions into
electronically transmitted communications.89 The 1985 study
determined that “ legal protections for electronic mail [were]
‘weak, ambiguous, or non-existent,’ and that ‘electronic mail
remain[ed] legally as well as technically vulnerable to
unauthorized surveillance.’ ”90
Congress amended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 196891 and consequently modernized the
legislation, expanding its scope to a new category of electronic
communications.92 Through the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, Congress ultimately extended then-existing wire
and oral communication protections to the new electronic
communications.93
The ECPA consists of three federal statutes: (1) the
Wiretap Act,94 (2) the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),95
The Fifth Circuit
and (3) the Pen Register Statute.96
evaluated the interaction between the ECPA and the SCA as
follows:
Congress’ use of the word ‘transfer’ in the definition of
‘electronic communication,’ and its omission in that
definition of the phrase ‘any electronic storage of such
communication’ (part of the definition of ‘wire
communication’) reflects that Congress did not intend for
‘intercept’ to apply to ‘electronic communications’ when
those communications are in ‘electronic storage.’ 97

89. See S. REP., supra note 86, at 5.
90. See id. at 4.
91. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968). This statute represented the primary federal statute
governing wire and oral communication interceptions. See Nguyen supra note
30, at 2215.
92. See Nicholas Matlach, Who Let the Katz Out? How the ECPA and SCA
Fail to Apply to Modern Digital Communications and How Returning to the
Principles in Katz v. United States Will Fix It, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 421,
442 (2010).
93. See S. REP., supra note 86, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3559.
94. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22.
95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10.
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27.
97. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th
Cir. 1994).
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This interplay evinced a standard: the ECPA governs a
communication transitioning between the source and the
destination, while the SCA governs the communication once
Accordingly, the Stored
it reaches its destination.98
Communications Act is the principal legislation controlling
online privacy rights, including e-mail and cloud computing.99
IV. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The way in which the Internet functions seemingly
frustrates arguments for robust Fourth Amendment
protection in remotely stored files under the current
doctrine.100 The 1986 Senate ECPA Report recognized that a
communication “subject to control by a third party computer
operator” might, similar to the bank records in Miller, “be
In
subject to no constitutional privacy protection.”101
conjunction with changes in communications technology and
content-proliferation, Congress enacted new privacy
measures through the SCA.102 Congress acknowledged “[f]or
the person or business whose records are involved, the
privacy or proprietary interest in that information should not
change” solely because the information is maintained and
stored by a service provider as opposed to one’s person or
one’s business premises.103 By statutorily codifying end-users’
privacy rights for their stored account information held by
third party network service providers, the SCA addresses the
inherent imbalances between the Fourth Amendment and the
Internet’s function.104
The SCA safeguards Fourth-Amendment privacy-like
rights by supervising the interplay between service providers
(who possess and maintain users’ private information) and
government investigators.105 Chapter 121 of the United
States Code is comprised of two principal sections: Section
2702 (voluntary disclosure of customer communications or
98. See Matlach, supra note 92, at 448.
99. See Derek Constantine, Cloud Computing: The Next Great Technological
Innovation, the Death of Online Privacy, or Both?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 503
(2012).
100. See Kerr, Lifting the Fog, supra note 49, at 806.
101. See S. REP., supra note 86, at 3.
102. See Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of
Electronic Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 607 (2007).
103. See S. REP., supra note 86, at 3.
104. See Kerr, SCA User’s Guide, supra note 4, at 1212.
105. Id.
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records) and Section 2703 (compelled disclosure of customer
communications or records).106
For purposes of
understanding relevant terminology, the discussion of Section
2703 will precede the Section 2702 discussion.
A. Section 2703: Compelled Governmental Access
This section intricately sets forth the circumstances
whereby service providers must disclose customer
communications and information to government entities.
Section 2703 provides three mechanisms by which the
government compels disclosure: (1) search warrant, (2) court
order, or (3) subpoena.107
A search warrant requires the government to comply
with the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement:
given the totality of the circumstances, the government must
establish, at a minimum, a fair probability that the defendant
committed the crime.108 The other procedural mechanisms by
their very nature fall short of the Fourth Amendment
safeguards.
The court order mandates that the government provide
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or
electronic communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
Use of a Section 2703(d) court order
investigation.”109
typically requires prior notice to the affected customer or
subscriber.110 This standard represents an intermediate level
that is lower than the search warrant’s probable cause but
more exacting than the reasonable relevance standard
required for subpoenas.111
The third and most lenient standard is for a subpoena
issued upon a showing of “reasonable relevance.”112 Under
this standard, the government need only show that the
information it seeks bears reasonable relevance to a criminal

106. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–03.
107. See id. § 2703(a)–(b).
108. See Kattan, supra note 7, at 630 (noting that the warrant does not
require certainty).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
110. Id. § 2705.
111. See Sarah Salter, Storage and Privacy in the Cloud: Enduring Access to
Ephemeral Messages, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 365, 375 (2010).
112. See Kattan, supra note 7, at 631.
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investigation.113
Under Section 2703, the point at which a governmental
entity must obtain a search warrant supported by probable
cause, or a less exacting form of process in order to compel
disclosure of electronically stored communications, relies
exclusively
upon
three
distinctions:
(1)
content
communication information and non-content communication
information,114 (2) Electronic Communications Service (“ECS”)
and Remote Computing Service (“RCS”),115 and (3)
communications stored with an ECS for 180 days or less and
communications stored with an ECS for over 180 days.116
These fundamental distinctions yield varying levels of
protection for electronically stored information.117
1. The Content-Non-Content Dichotomy
Here, the rules are the same for both ECS and RCS
providers.118 Name and e-mail address of the recipient, for
example, constitute non-content under the SCA.119 A warrant
is never required where the government compels access to
non-content information.120 Where the government seeks
access to the “contents” of electronic communications—
”information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning
of that communication”—maintained in “electronic storage,”
however, the government may be required to obtain a search
warrant consistent with its corresponding Fourth
Amendment requirements.121
2. Electronic Storage
The ECPA defines electronic storage as “any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
113. Id.
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
115. See id. § 2703(a)–(b).
116. See id. § 2703(c)(1).
117. Id. at 142.
118. See Kerr, SCA User’s Guide, supra note 4, at 1219.
119. See Charles H. Kennedy, An ECPA for the 21st Century: The Present
Reform Efforts and Beyond, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 129, 142 (2011) (the
ECPA defines content as any information that assists with routing or
addressing of a communications, identifies the time of the communication, or
conveys information about a subscriber other than the contents of the
subscriber falls outside of the content category).
120. See id.
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17); see generally 18
U.S.C. § 2703; see Kennedy, supra note 119, at 141.
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incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and . . . any
storage of such communication by an electronic
communications service for purposes of backup protection of
such communication.”122
While the ECPA provides a fairly straightforward
definition of “electronic storage,” it has been the subject of
much debate in practice. The confusion exists between
delivered and opened e-mails and those that remain in posttransmission storage on the provider’s facilities. A federal
judge found the ECPA did not protect e-mails where such emails remained stored after the recipient opened them.123
They were in neither “temporary, immediate storage” nor
“backup storage.”124 While the U.S. Department of Justice
prefers this position, the Ninth Circuit took the opposite view
and found e-mails protected by the ECPA, as posttransmission storage served as a backup function.125
3. The ECS-RCS Dichotomy
The SCA defines an ECS as “any service which provides
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications.”126 The SCA defines RCS as “the provision
to the public of computer storage or processing services by
means of an electronic communications system.”127 Where
ECS-maintained communications must remain in “electronic
storage” to receive any protections under the statute, RCSmaintained contents receive their corresponding protections
where (1) it is held or maintained on its customer’s behalf,128
and where (2) the provider is authorized to access the
communication’s contents only to provide such storage or
services.129
The ease with which the government can obtain an ECS

122. Id. § 2510(17).
123. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635 (E.D.
Pa. 2001).
124. Id.
125. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
127. Id. § 2711(2) (defining “electronic communications system” as “any wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photo-optical or photoelectric facilitates for the
transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or
related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications.”).
128. See id. § 2703(b)(2)(A).
129. See id. § 2703(b)(2)(B).
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maintained communication depends exclusively on its time in
“electronic storage.” While the SCA mandates that the
government procure a search warrant for contents stored for
180 days or less, access to the same exact contents stored for
over 180 days is less onerous as it may be obtained with the
less exacting Section 2703(d) court order or subpoena.130 The
SCA provides limited procedural safeguards to ECS
communications stored for over 180 days and all RCS
contents alike.131 Accordingly, the government may compel
RCS providers to disclose contents by merely proffering a
court order or subpoena.
B. Section 2702: Voluntary Disclosures
The Fourth Amendment neither limits the ability of
private actors to voluntary disclose communications to the
government, nor prevents service providers from releasing
the contents of customer communications and information to
other private parties.132 While Congress enacted Section 2702
of the ECPA to remedy the Fourth Amendment’s shortcoming
and to provide guidance as to when disclosure of particular
communications and records is permitted, it did so through a
seemingly incoherent compilation of categories, definitions,
rules, and exceptions.133
1.

Non-Content Requests

Public providers may disclose non-content information,
without restriction, to any person other than a governmental
entity.134 On the other hand, such content may only be
disclosed to governmental entities where exceptionssuch as
service of process by the governmental entityapply.135 Nonpublic providers may voluntarily disclose non-content to any
private or governmental entity, but may be required to

130. See id. § 2703(b)(1).
131. See id. § 2703(a)–(b).
132. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 137; see also United States v. Katz, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967); and see United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364
(2010).
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)–(8).
134. See id. § 2703(c)(2) (Contents is defined in the ECPA: “[W]hen used with
respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, [contents] include any
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication.”).
135. See id. § 2702(c)(6); see also § 2703(c)(1).
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produce such material upon service of process.136
2.

Content Requests to a Public ECS Provider

ECS providers who offer services to the public may not
divulge the contents of a communications to a private party
unless the enumerated exceptions apply.137 Even in the event
of civil litigation with corresponding civil subpoenas
demanding such contents, the Section 2702 exceptions would
be inapplicable, requiring the service provider to maintain
the customer contents as private.138 Essentially, absent
statutory exception or user consent, the provider must refuse
the private party’s request.
The circumstances differ where the government seeks
production of customer communications and records.
Voluntary disclosure to the government is not permitted;
however, Section 2702 permits disclosure authorized by
Section 2703.139 Accordingly compliance with governmental
request for disclosure is allowed where the government
procures a search warrant, subpoena, or court order.140
3.

Content Requests to a Non-Public ECS Provider

As Section 2702 omits statutory obligations with respect
136. See id. §§ 2702(c)(1), (4), (6), 2703(c)(1). See also Kennedy, supra note
119, at 140 (“A public ECS or RCS provider may disclose non-content customer
information to any non–governmental entity. Disclosures of such information to
governmental entities may be made only where an exception—such as consent
of a party or subscriber or service of process by the governmental entity—
applies . . . . A non–public ECS or RCS provider may disclose non–content
customer information to any private or governmental entity but may be
compelled to do so only upon service of process.”).
137. See id. § 2702(b)–(c) (detailing the exceptions for communications and
customer records, respectively: delivery to intended recipients of those
communications and other lawful purposes “necessarily incident to the
rendition of the services or to the protection of rights or property of the provider
of that service,” or “with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or
intended recipient of such communication.”).
138. See id. Kennedy, supra, note 119, at 139 n.57 (“neither subpart’s
exceptions covers subpoenas brought by nongovernmental litigants.”).
139. See id. § 2702(b)–(c).
140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(2), 2703(a)–(d). See also, Kennedy, supra note 119,
at 140 (“A public ECS or RCS provider may disclose the contents of a
communication stored on its service to a governmental or non-governmental
entity only where an exception—such as the consent of a party or subscriber or
service of process by a governmental entity—applies . . . . A non–public ECS or
RCS provider may voluntarily disclose the contents of a communication stored
on its service to a private or governmental entity but may be compelled to do so
only upon service of process.”).
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to private networks and other entities that do not hold
themselves out to serve the public, such providers may freely
disclose contents to a private third party, subject to
contractual privacy assurances the provider has given its
users.141
Since the non-public service provider is not subject to
Section 2702, such providers are not required to adhere to
Section 2703 when dealing with a governmental entity.142
While it can freely disclose content to the government, the
government cannot compel it to do so unless the government
complies with disclosure mechanisms enumerated in Section
2703.143
V. ECPA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2013
In September 2010, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary held its first hearing on ECPA reform,
acknowledging that the ECPA represents legislation passed
when most of today’s technological pioneers were toddlers or
young children.144 On March 19, 2013, Senator Patrick Leahy
introduced the Electronic Communications Amendments Act
Accompanied by
of 2013 (“2013 Amendments Act”).145
bipartisan support, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
unanimously voted the ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 to
move onto the full Senate for a vote on April 25, 2013.146
The bill aims to amend several provisions of the ECPA.147
Notably, the bill—as introduced—would generally prohibit
both ECS and RCS providers from voluntarily disclosing its
141. See id. § 2702. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 139.
142. See id. 18 U.S.C. § 2073(c). See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 139 (“nonpublic service provider[s] . . . [are] not required to apply the exception
permitting disclosures that are authorized by 2703 when [they] deal with a
governmental entity.”).
143. See id. § 2703. Kennedy, supra note 119, at 139 (“[communications],
whether held on a public or private service, enjoy the privacy interests
recognized by section 2703 when it imposes constraints on governmental
access.”).
144. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
145. Electronic Communications Privacy Amendments Act of 2013, S. 607,
113th Cong. (2013) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 25, 2013).
146. Senate Judiciary Panel Votes to Require Warrants for Police E-mail
Searches,
DIGITAL
DUE
PROCESS
(Apr.
25,
2013),
http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=7BAE62D0–B112–11E2–
98D7000C296BA163.
147. S. 607 §§ 2, 3 (2013).
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customers’
electronic
communications
contents
to
governmental entities.148 While it would still retain the ECSRCS distinctions, it would adopt a uniform search warrant
standard
for
production
of
customer
electronic
communications held in “electronic storage with or otherwise
The
stored, held, or maintained by the provider.”149
government must also promptly notify the customer whose
content has been accessed via a third-party service provider,
and consequently provide that user with a copy of the
warrant and related information.150 Finally, the bill would
eliminate the rule that allows the government to obtain emails in electronic storage after 180 days.151
VI. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CLOUD COMPUTING
In theory, ECPA serves as a useful government tool;
however, in its current state it is “hampered by conflicting
standards that cause confusion for law enforcement, the
business community, and American consumers alike.”152 The
Senate Judiciary Committee observed in 1986 that “[p]rivacy
cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it
While
will gradually erode as technology advances.”153
increasingly more American households have access to
broadband Internet, and while nearly 70 percent of
Americans utilize Internet webmail, store data online, or use
online software programs, the SCA has been largely
unmodified to reflect these shifts.154 At the time Congress
adopted the ECPA, there was no World Wide Web, and Mark
Zuckerberg, who would grow to start Facebook, was merely

148. Id. § 3(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service of the
contents of a wire or electronic communication that is in electronic storage with
or otherwise stored, held, or maintained by the provider only if the
governmental entity obtains a warrant.”)..
149. Id. § 3(a).
150. Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy on Committee Consideration Of The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, DIGITAL DUE
PROCESS (Apr. 25, 2013), http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=8808E
3B0-ADC6-11E2-98D7000C296BA163.
151. See S. 607 § 3 (2013).
152. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Government Perspectives on
Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
153. S. REP., supra note 86, at 5.
154. See Scolnik, supra note 3, at 378.
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two years old.155 Now, the law regulating Facebook is almost
as old its founder.156
Notable legal implications emanate from the SCA’s
narrow scope. Section 2703 provides the government with the
unique occasion to circumvent long established privacy rights.
It does not function as a catch-all statute that safeguards all
stored Internet communications; rather, it is narrowly
tailored to provide a set of Fourth Amendment-like
protections to a very specific class of Internet
The ECS-RCS distinction does not
communications.157
capture all providers; as such, many cloud computing services
either fluctuate between an ECS and RCS status or
completely fall outside the SCA’s purview.158 Classifying
cloud services as ECS, RCS, or neither impacts what rights
the user has with respect to his or her data. Unfortunately
for cloud users who fall outside the SCA’s narrow scope, the
courts’ jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment governs the
privacy of their communications, and the existing case law
under the third party doctrine does little to protect papers
and documents increasingly stored in the cloud.159
While the 1986 ECPA stands as one of our nation’s
premiere privacy laws, it is painfully outdated.160 In the
years since the ECPA’s enactment, technology has seen a
dramatic, and arguably disruptive development as far as
services available to electronic communications users.161 As
technology has fundamentally changed the way we store and
use information since 1986, the existing ECPA represents a
very apparent disconnect between privacy expectations and
statutory protections.162 There is no comprehensive federal
legislation that sets statutory minimum requirements
safeguarding users’ privacy and personal data in the cloud.163
As such, the cloud threatens to undermine and delegitimize

155. Gerber, supra note 26, at 256.
156. Id.
157. See Kerr, SCA User’s Guide, supra note 4, at 1214.
158. See William J. Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1209 (2010).
159. See Soghoian, supra note 19, at 390.
160. See Gerber, supra note 26, at 257.
161. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 145.
162. See Mulligan, supra note 65, at 1572.
163. Nancy J. King & V.T. Raja, What Do They Really Know About Me in the
Cloud? A Comparative Law Perspective on Protecting Privacy and Security of
Sensitive Consumer Data, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 443 (2013).
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the regulatory approaches to information privacy in the
United States.164
This disconnect spawned an uproar among various
organizations, congressmen, companies, and Americans alike.
The ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 is certainly well-received
by the 1986 ECPA-critics; however, similar issues arising
under the 1986 ECPA may likely manifest themselves in the
2013 Amendments Act, should Congress enact the proposed
bill. To varying extents, both the ECPA and the 2013
Amendment Act reflect the pre-Internet computing landscape
seen by the 1980s.165 As the ways we communicate in the
cloud computing arena place a tremendous strain on the 1986
statutory dichotomies, the proposed amendments, while a
considerable improvement from their predecessor, will
continue to stifle cloud computing’s ability to achieve its
future promise.
VII. CLOUD COMPUTING UNDER THE 1986 ECPA & THE
ECPA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2013
As the past twenty-eight years since the ECPA’s
enactment have seen numerous dramatic and statutorily
disruptive developments in technology and electronic
communications,166 this analysis will proceed by discussing
the predominant flaws under the existing 1986 ECPA
framework in the cloud computing arena, and then assess
whether the ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 has the ability to
remedy its predecessor’s shortcoming.
This analysis will discuss four issues with respect to
cloud computing, the existing legal framework, and the
potential framework in light of the proposed amendments: (A)
the definition of electronic storage, (B) the ECS-RCS
distinction, (C) the corresponding 180-day rule for ECS
communications, and (D) a doctrinal approach to the cloud
under the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Uncertain “Electronic Storage” Definition
The SCA complicates the already muddled boundary of
The SCA protects the
cloud-storage searches.167
164.
165.
166.
167.

See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1646.
See Scolnik, supra note 3.
See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 145.
See Mark Wilson, Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing Constitutional
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communication provided the ECS provider maintains the
communication in “electronic storage.”168
The Department of Justice approach to “electronic
storage” recognizes limited protection for electronic
communications accessed by its recipient, not maintained in
“electronic storage” by an ECS.169 Conversely, in finding that
e-mails were “stored” by an ECS service within the meaning
of the SCA, the Ninth Circuit determined that the second
clause of the “electronic storage” definition applied to data
only where it is stored for backup purposes.170 In dicta, the
Ninth Circuit left open the inquiry as to whether “[a] remote
computing service might be the only place a user stores his
messages; in that case, the messages are not stored for
backup purposes.”171
By leaving this inquiry open, the Ninth Circuit
essentially described the cloud-computing quandary:
individuals use the cloud for numerous purposes, including,
but not limited to, backing up information.172 Under this
interpretation, such use of cloud services falls outside the
purview of the SCA, as the data was not stored exclusively for
“backup purposes.”173 Files stored on Google Docs and the
like illustrate this dilemma. Files stored on these servers are
not necessarily stored for “backup purposes” and therefore are
not in “electronic storage,” since the contents are “constantly
updated as the software, installed on a user’s computer or
smart phone, monitors the local file for changes and updates
the server’s copy as necessary.”174
As the Senate Judiciary Committee left this portion of
the SCA untouched, the varying approaches to the “electronic
storage” provision with respect to cloud computing
necessarily mean that communications sent and maintained

Protections for Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 261, 276 (2013).
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2).
169. See Kattan, supra note 7, at 636 & n.155.
170. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (2003) (reasoning the
intent to store data for such purposes must be the motivating purpose for
storage and not merely another possible reason for storage; therefore, the mere
possibility that a copy could serve as a backup does not constitute electronic
storage under the SCA).
171. Id. at 1077.
172. See Wilson, supra note 167, at 278.
173. Id. (footnote omitted).
174. Id. (footnote omitted).
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in the cloud will vary and drift outside the statutory purview
of ECS-provider protection.175
B. The ECS-RCS Distinction
A cloud user’s constitutionally mandated privacy is
predicated on the characterization of the cloud service
provider and the particular content stored in that cloud under
the ECPA’s complicated ECS-RCS analytical framework,
which no longer bears any technological significance today.176
This distinction becomes increasingly problematic where
cloud services cannot be characterized as ECS or RCS, since
contents of electronic communications falling outside these
technical definitions “can [be] disclose[d] or use[d] with
impunity.”177
The justification proffered by Congress in drawing a
distinction between ECS and RCS is that “by ‘renting’
computer storage space with a remote computing service, a
customer places himself in the same situation as one who
gives business records to an accountant.”178
The inconsistent burdens of proof imposed on the
government with respect to electronic communications—
particularly RCS—made sense when memory was scarce.179
Service providers could assume that intended e-mail
recipients effectively abandoned his or her e-mails after 180
Likewise, the ECPA’s disparate treatment for
days.180
information stored on businesses’ own computers—as opposed
to a remote vendor—did not carry with it such dramatic
implications as it does today.181 Congress’ justification is now
inaccurate given the way in which Internet communication
systems function.182
The extent to which communications sent through cloud-

175. See Kattan, supra note 7, at 636.
176. Id. at 655; see e.g., n.312 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) which requires a
search warrant to compel ECS providers to disclose communications in
“electronic storage” for 180 days or less and describes the tripartite standard
that applies to compel RCS providers).
177. See Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (D. Del. 1997) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2702(a).
178. See Nguyen, supra note 30, at 2205 (footnote omitted).
179. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 145–46 (footnote omitted).
180. See Kerr, SCA User’s Guide, supra note 4, at 1234.
181. See Julie J. McMurry, Privacy in the Information Age: The Need for
Clarity in the ECPA, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 617 (2000).
182. See Nguyen, supra note 30, at 2205 (footnote omitted).
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based servers receive search warrant protection remains
unclear as various cloud-based system-services present
increasingly difficult cases.
As these cloud computing
services tend to fall short of the SCA’s twin requirements for
ECS communications, they do not enjoy the heightened
protections afforded to ECS communications.183 Where ECSqualifying services must provide users with “the ability to
send or receive . . . electronic communications,” many of
today’s cloud services are programmed for purposes other
than communication and lack any sending or receiving
functionality.184 Moreover, as “electronic storage” is a term of
art, cloud services fail to satisfy its narrow definition.185
Contrary to the SCA’s requirement that the electronic storage
exist as temporary and incidental to service, numerous cloud
services offer users considerable storage capacity to facilitate
Furthermore, many cloud
long-term data retention.186
providers offer their storage service together with
applications designed to access and deploy that data through
remote computers.187 As cloud users’ content, with the very
narrow exceptional e-mail category, is stored inconsistent
with the twin ECS provider and “electronic storage
requirements,” the heightened ECS protections are poorly
suited for the cloud.188
The existing RCS definition leaves its scope somewhat
unclear.189 The SCA defines RCS as “the provision to the
public of computer storage or processing services by means of
an electronic communications system.”190 While computer
storage is a relatively clear concept today, the question as to
what constitutes a “processing service” posits a more trivial
question especially with the invention of the World Wide
Web.191 The legislative history indicates that such services
183. See Robison, supra note 158, at 1209 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See,
e.g.,
Gmail
Help:
Archiving
Mail,
http://
https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6576?hl=en (last visited Oct. 12, 2013)
(noting that Gmail’s archive function “removes messages from your inbox . . .
but keeps them in your account so that you can always find them later.”).
187. See, e.g., Google Docs, https://www.google.com/docs/about/ (last visited
Feb. 10, 2015) (discussing its multiple applications for creating and editing docs,
presentations, and spreadsheets).
188. See Robison, supra note 158, at 1209–10.
189. See Kerr, SCA User’s Guide, supra note 4, at 1229.
190. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2012).
191. See Kerr, SCA User’s Guide, supra note 4, at 1229–30.
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refer to outsourcing functions.192 To the extent computer
networks existed in 1986, they predominately operated over
proprietary facilities, not over systems controlled by thirdparty vendors.193 Remote data processing did not yet exist as
a means by which electronic communication and information
was exchanged; rather, it was a method by which multiple
users shared mainframe computers.194
While the ECS characterization almost entirely excludes
cloud services from its protection, a quick glance at the SCA’s
RCS requirements leaves cloud users with false hope by
initially availing their respective cloud provider to an RCSqualifying status.195 Most cloud providers offer—as the
qualifying RCS providers must—public computer storage or
processing services over a network. Relying on the seemingly
short analysis, some courts have applied the RCS provisions
to cloud computing services, ostensibly consistent with legal
scholars’ opinions and the SCA’s legislative history.
While on its face, cloud computing satisfies the RCS
requirements, the analysis used to reach this conclusion is
inherently flawed: it neglects to account for the remaining
requirements.196 There are five remaining prerequisites that
must be satisfied to qualify as an RCS provider.197 It is
commonplace for many cloud providers to adopt models that
disregard the final two requirements, precluding an RCS
qualification.
Consider
the
fairly
recent
social
networking
phenomenon. How should the site fall within the narrow
SCA classifications where it stores and processes profile
information (RCS-like), yet where it also permits
communication among users (ECS-like)?198
192. See id.
193. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 145.
194. See Mulligan, supra note 65, at 1560–61.
195. See Robison, supra note 158, at 1211.
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2012).
197. See id. While the cloud services ordinarily satisfy the requirements that
the data (1) contain “content,” (2) be “carried or maintained . . . on behalf of . . .
a subscriber or customer,” and (3) have been electronically transmitted to the
provider, the SCA also mandates (4) that the customer-data be transmitted to
the cloud provider “solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer
processing services,” but that the cloud provider (5) “not [be] authorized to
access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any
services other than storage or computer processing.”
198. See Kattan, supra note 7, at 637–40 (discussing the narrow ECS-RCS
application to Gmail).
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Also consider how cloud services are profitable if they
provide their services free of charge. These providers often
rely on some advertising revenue to fund their operations.
While advertising does not violate the SCA’s requirements
per se, numerous cloud providers provide targeted advertising
opportunities where advertisers utilize targeted marketing
campaigns that reach specific audiences by accessing the
user’s website-visits.
This business model necessarily
requires access to content, in contravention with the SCA’s
“solely for the purposes of storage” mandate.199 Where
customers authorize access to their data for such advertising
services in exchange for free access to the cloud services, the
SCA will not apply and the data will be subject to
disclosure.200
The implications of such classifications are sweeping, as
RCS contents are never protected by a probable-cause
standard.201 While the SCA fails to recognize this dichotomy,
proprietary and confidential records stored within an RCS
can be as sensitive and valuable as e-mails stored with an
ECS.202 These distinctions neither conform to the reasonable
expectation of Americans nor serve the public interest.
While the Senate committee’s bill eliminates the tiered
standards for ECS and RCS communications, it does not
entirely remove the ECS-RCS terminology. This can prove
fatal because the approach still relies on definitions of
obsolete technology where these distinctions no longer
matter.203 Even under the proposed legislation, some cloud
services can slip through the cracks and escape the ECPA’s
protections in general.
C. The ECS 180-Day Distinction
Cloud computing platforms allow users to store e-mails
on providers’ servers for increasing periods of time and
In 2004, for example, Gmail
sometimes indefinitely.204
provided users with one gigabyte of free storage.205 Now,
almost a decade later, Gmail users enjoy fifteen gigabytes of
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See Robison, supra note 158, at 1213.
Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).
See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 151.
See Cheng, supra note 39, at 495.
See Scolnik, supra note 3, at 378.
See id.
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free storage.206 In spite of the seemingly infinite amount of
free storage, the existing standard is still wedged in the
crevices of 1986 technology. In setting forth two varying
levels of protection for e-mails on third party servers, existing
users essentially surrender their reasonable expectation of
privacy—and consequently their Fourth Amendment
protection—between day 179 and 181.207 Where e-mails are
stored on servers for 180 days or less, the government must
fully comply with the Fourth Amendment by providing a
search warrant supported by probable cause. On the other
hand, the government need only meet a Section 2703(d)
standard—specific
articulable
facts—or
a
subpoena
standard—reasonable relevance—to access e-mails stored on
the server for over 180 days.208
While the existing law circumvents the Fourth
Amendment in the 48-hour period between day 179 and 181,
the technological circumstances have not always been as
such. The rationale for these distinctions are based in large
part on 1986-era technology and the expectations those
limitations created.209 When Congress enacted the ECPA in
1986, e-mail service providers could not maintain customers’
e-mails on their servers for extended periods of time, as the
storage capacity was significantly limited.210 “Most—if not
all—electronic communication systems (such as electronic
mail systems), however, only ke[pt] copies of messages for a
Beyond that point, storage bore more
few months.”211
resemblance to business records maintained by a third
party.212
As the ECPA’s drafters gave customers a weak and
arguably nonexistent expectation of privacy in the contents of
their message, they likely assumed that any e-mails stored
for over 180 days had never been retrieved.213 In 1986, ISPs
stored user e-mails to the extent it was deemed necessary,
i.e., until the user logged in and downloaded their mail.214
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
Before

See id. at 378.
See Oza, supra note 59, at 1057.
See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 143.
See id.
See Oza, supra note 59, at 1072.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 68 (1986).
Id.
See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 143.
See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the
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The reality of this statutory scheme is that customers
who store their e-mails on their computer indefinitely are
protected by a warrant requirement, yet users who access
their e-mails in the cloud may not receive such protections,
depending on the contents’ time in storage.215 It is also ironic
that:
[T]he e-mails or private messages that are both the most
important and the most private are the older messages
that you have read through several times and have
intentionally decided to save . . . . By contrast, the
unopened e-mails in your inbox are likely to be
commercial solicitations that you have not yet had time to
delete.”216

This irony demonstrates that the SCA, as applied to e-mail, is
unconstitutional.
The judiciary has been sluggish in
recognizing Fourth Amendment protections for electronic
information that would otherwise receive constitutional
protection but-for its electronic character.217 United States v.
Ferguson218 properly applied Section 2703 and Section 2705
while
concurrently
undermining
traditional
Fourth
Amendment protections.
During an investigation in
Ferguson, the government discovered that Ferguson
maintained accounts with both Yahoo! Mail and MSN
Hotmail and successfully submitted a request to a magistrate
to compel both services to produce all e-mails maintained in
their storage for over 180 days.219 Given the ECPA’s 180-day
requirement, e-mails held in storage for over 180 days were
turned over without a warrant.220 Had Ferguson used a
desktop application such as Microsoft Outlook with POP
settings, they would have been unreachable by the ECPA and
would not have been turned over to the government without a
search warrant.221

Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter ECPA Reform
and the Revolution in Cloud Computing] (statement of Michael Hintze,
Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation).
215. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 143–44.
216. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing, supra note 214,
at 123 (statement of Marc J. Zwillinger, Partner, Zwillinger Genetski LLP).
217. See Wilson, supra note 167, at 273.
218. United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2007).
219. Id. at 8.
220. See Oza, supra note 59, at 1061.
221. See Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
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Recently in United States v. Warshak,222 the Sixth Circuit
recognized a Fourth Amendment right for e-mails stored
within an ISP. There, the United States procured 27,000 of
Warshak’s e-mails utilizing an administrative subpoena
pursuant to the SCA that ultimately led to Warshak’s mail
and bank fraud convictions.223 The Sixth Circuit found that
while Warshak had privacy protections under the Fourth
Amendment, the government’s reliance on the SCA precluded
reversing Warshak’s conviction.224 Nevertheless, the court
held “to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the
government to obtain such e-mails warrantlessly, the SCA is
unconstitutional.”225
Together, Ferguson and Warshak represent the very
disconnect between the ECPA and modern technology. The
balance struck by Congress in 1986 falls severely out of
alignment in light of the advent of cloud computing and
increased online storage capacities. This distinction merely
puts an increasing amount of user data within law
enforcement’s reach, requiring lower, and arguably
Federal statutory
unconstitutional, burdens of proof.226
protection for e-mails should not depend on how the users
choose to store their e-mail.227
Acknowledging that distinguishing privacy protections
based on a stored-content’s age bears no logic in light of
today’s cloud computing capabilities, the Senate Judiciary
Committee struck the 180-day requirement in the ECPA
Amendments Act of 2013.228 Under the proposed bill, users
who opt to leave their e-mails in the cloud do not suffer a
decrease in privacy protections.229 This legislation would not
discriminate against those utilizing the cloud paradigm; as
such, users’ data would remain confidential and could only be
accessed with due process of law.230

222. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010).
223. Id. at 282.
224. Id. at 274.
225. Id. at 288.
226. See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing, supra note
214, at 25.
227. See id. at 120.
228. See Electronic Communications Privacy Amendments Act of 2013, S.
607, 113th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2013).
229. See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing, supra note
214, at 29.
230. Id. at 40.
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D. The Fourth Amendment Application to the Cloud
Applying the Fourth Amendment to any cloud service
proliferates confusion. Smith, Miller, and Couch establish
that the third party doctrine precludes some legitimate
privacy expectation where the third party is a business.231
The implications that arise from the Fourth Amendment’s
caveat is that where a user transmits electronic
communications over a third party’s server, the government
may approach the third party to produce documents, all while
remaining consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.232
Notwithstanding the third party doctrine, several recent
decisions involving the Fourth Amendment protection in the
cloud arena manifest the lower courts’ willingness to extend
Fourth Amendment protection to the cloud.233 In Quon v.
Arch Wireless Operating Co., the court emphasized the
importance of an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to the item seized or the area searched.234
Although the United States Supreme Court reversed—
leaving unaddressed the reasonable expectation of privacy
issue—the lower courts seemingly demonstrate their
deference for the increasing importance of online
environments by applying the Fourth Amendment to the
individual, irrespective of the situation.235 Moreover, the
current Fourth Amendment framework does not necessarily
preclude the courts from continuing to apply this methodology
to the cloud. Miller and Smith do not control the cloud issue
specifically. Storing one’s data on a third-party server is not
analogous to conducting business with a bank, and an IP
address is not comparable to a telephone number.236

231. See Small, supra note 16, at 269.
232. See Constantine, supra note 99, at 513–16.
233. See Quon v. Arch Wireless 529 F.3d 892, 910 (2010) (finding that
employees maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy with their text
messages); see also State v. Bellar, 217 P.3d 1094, 1107 (Or. Ct. App. 2009)
(“[D]efendant did not relinquish his privacy interest in the data stored on his
computer’s hard drive and that privacy interest continued after the data was
transferred.”).
234. See Quon, 529 F.3d at 904. The United States Supreme Court reversed
but neglected to address the reasonable expectation of privacy issue.
235. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1976).
236. See R. Bruce Wells, The Fog of Cloud Computing: Fourth Amendment
Issues Raised by the Blurring of Online and Offline Content, 12 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 223, 237 (2009).
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Despite this emerging judicial pattern, the courts should
not be expected to traverse the intricate technological
landscapes.
Given that Congress has the benefit of
overwhelming industry input, statutory guidance will yield
more accurate and exacting standards. Accordingly, the
initial reform in the cloud-computing arena must originate in
the legislature.
VIII. CLEARING THE AIR: HOW TO MAKE WAY FOR THE
CLOUD
While the Senate Judiciary Committee passed the ECPA
Amendments Act of 2013 with overwhelming accord, there is
no guarantee that Congress will enact the legislation,
considering they failed to pass similar amendments in
2011.237 The ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 is certainly a
step in the right direction; however, as the aforementioned
analysis indicates, it does not offer adequate remedies for the
existing cloud-privacy concerns.
Limiting the Fourth Amendment’s application to the
online environment and narrowly construing the SCA
language would severely constrict the benefits offered by
cloud computing and undermine individuals’ and companies’
trust in the technology.238 One of the primary advantages
that the United States would gain in adopting new cloudcomputing laws would be a coherent legal framework that
replaces the archaic and fragmented statutory schemes that
The ECPA should undergo a
currently govern.239
comprehensive amendment process that provides fluid
emerging technologies the same protections as their existing
equivalents. In doing so, however, Congress must achieve a
balance between protecting user-privacy rights and avoiding
unduly cumbersome provisions that restrict the free flow of
data that is the essence of cloud computing.240 An effective
solution must underscore using and strengthening the
existing legal frameworks under both the Fourth Amendment
and the ECPA, as well as using these foundations to oversee
the doctrines’ application to the cloud paradigm and emerging

237.
238.
239.
240.

See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 156.
See Constantine, supra note 99, at 524.
See Gerber, supra note 26, at 275.
See id. at 273.
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technologies.241
While industry leaders overwhelmingly advocate for
reform that includes increased privacy, law critics favor
private sector accommodations over legislative approaches.242
Such critics argue that proposed privacy regulations interfere
with the private relationship between ISPs and their
customers,
disrupt
the
free-market
for
electronic
communications service, and reason that “protecting privacy
Although critics express their
imposes real costs.”243
discomfort with government interference in the consumerindustry relationship, this arguably narrow view neglects to
address the significant costs imposed by the cloud’s weak
privacy protections. The cloud’s appeal is its innovative
Inadequate
technology and overwhelming flexibility.244
privacy protection, particularly in the cloud’s early stage, will
not only moot its flexibility, but will also impede innovation.
Excessive government accessibility to the cloud is imprudent,
as consumer and industry trust in cloud computing cannot be
undermined.245 Addressing the current shortcomings of cloud
privacy legislation necessarily requires entrusting the entities
with the appropriate faculties to remedy the statutory
deficiencies.246
As the ECPA Amendments Act of 2013 and the analysis
above indicate, the 180-day ECS distinction and the lowered
protection for RCS communications serve no legitimate
purpose. The 180-day distinction and corresponding tiered
standards for ECS communications essentially eviscerate one
of the cloud’s premiere advantages: increased capacity.247
Similarly, the lowered protection afforded to RCS
communications is arguably unconstitutional.
In conjunction with removing the 180-day rule and tiered
privacy standards for different communications, Congress
should also eliminate the SCA’s ECS-RCS distinction and
241. See Carol M. Celestine, “Cloudy” Skies, Bright Futures? In Defense of A
Private Regulatory Scheme for Policing Cloud Computing, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y, SPRING 2013, at 141, 158.
242. See Katherine A. Oyama, E-Mail Privacy After United States v.
Councilman: Legislative Options for Amending ECPA, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
499, 525 (2006).
243. Fred H. Cate, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 102 (1997).
244. See Celestine, supra note 241, at 158.
245. See King & Raja, supra note 163, at 470.
246. See Celestine, supra note 241, at 159–60, 164.
247. See Kattan, supra note 7, at 642.
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provide a unified technology and transmission neutral
definition. “Tech neutrality” is a concept where, regardless of
future developments in communication technology, the
presence and application of the ECPA remain constant.248
This type of approach would provide equitable protection to
current and future technology alike.249 A “tech neutral”
definition in place of the ECS-RCS terminology should read to
apply for all content, transmitted under any Internet
medium, whether stored or otherwise maintained for any
length of time.250 Under this framework, user data stored and
processed in the cloud would receive the same level of
protection regardless of the platform or business model used
to generate, communicate, or store the data.251
A. Proposed Amendment for Definitions Under the SCA
The proposed amendments for definitions would involve
eliminating electronic communication service and remote
computing serviced definitions and replacing them with a
unified definition under the term “Internet Communication
Service.” The amendment would also revise the definition of
“electronic storage.” The amendments would read as follows:
§ 2510(15) Internet Communication Service
(A) any service which provides users, customers, or
subscribers with ability to send, receive, store, or otherwise
maintain wire or electronic communications.
§ 2510(17) “Electronic Storage”
(A) any wire or electronic communication that is stored
electronically or otherwise held, stored, or maintained by the
Internet Communication Service for any purpose of such
communication.
B. Proposed Amendment for Disclosures Under the SCA
The proposed amendments for the voluntary and
compelled disclosures incorporate the above amended
terminology, abolish the 180-day distinction, and require a
search warrant supported by probable cause for all content.
248. See Kerr, Fourth Amendment to the Internet, supra note 9, at 1016.
249. See Cheng, supra note 39, at 504.
250. See Christopher R. Brennan, Katz Cradle: Holding on to Fourth
Amendment Parity in an Age of Evolving Electronic Communication, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1797, 1822 (2012).
251. See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing, supra note
214, at 41.
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The amendments would read as follows:
§ 2702: Voluntary Disclosure
(a) Prohibitions. Except as provided in subsection (b) or
(c),
(1) an Internet Communication Service or its agent shall
not knowingly divulge to any person or entity either the
contents or records of that communication information
pertaining to a user, customer of or subscriber to such service.
§ 2703: Compelled Disclosure
(a) Contents of an Internet Communication Service in
electronic storage.
A governmental entity may require
disclosure by a provider of Internet Communication Service of
the contents of a wire or electronic communication in its
electronic storage only if the governmental entity obtains a
warrant issued according to the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State
court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of
competent jurisdiction directing the disclosure.
CONCLUSION: BLUE SKIES AHEAD
While the ECPA is nearly thirty years old, it functioned
as a progressive and enlightening statutory framework in the
years immediately following its enactment.252 This past
decade’s dramatic technological innovations have wreaked
havoc through the ECPA to the extent that it is inflexible and
no longer sustainable. Congress must promote innovation in
the cloud arena, and the only way to accomplish that objective
is to accommodate the past decade’s technological leaps. The
law should be concerned exclusively with personal data,
regardless of user-choice as to storage or other data
maintenance.253
It is crucial that Congress develop a clear understanding
with respect to the existing murky categories and
distinctions. In doing so, Congress should conform to userand-industry-reasonable expectations of privacy. In effect,
the above-amended statutes would not provide cloud users
preferential treatment; rather, it would provide equal process
under the law.254 These proposed revisions do not foreclose

252. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 161.
253. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1654.
254. See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing, supra note
214, at 110.
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flexibility from its framework. It fosters the ability to
innovate, protects consumer interests, and at the same time
equips law enforcement personnel with coherent standards
necessary to carry out their legitimate needs in the new
technological era.
By making the ECPA “tech neutral,” Congress can send a
message to individuals, companies, and global governments
that they can safely use current cloud platforms and future
platforms without compromising their users’ data privacy.

